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RECENT DECISIONS
LABOR-Authorization Cards-Employer ordered to bargain
without election with a union in a representative status through
unambiguous, single-purpose authorization cards if employer's
unfair labor practices substantially interfered with fair election
and union reached majority status through card count. NationZ
Labor ReZations Board v. Gissel Packing Co. (S. Ct. 1969).
In each of four cases1 consolidated on certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court, a union approached employees with
organizational material, secured signatures on single-purpose,
unambiguous authorization cards2 from a majority of the em-
ployees in each bargaining unit without coercion or misrepre-
sentation, and demanded recognition from the employer. The
employer thereupon refused to bargain with the representatives
and conducted vigorous anti-union campaigns. In two of the
cases, General Steel Products, Inc. v. T LRB and NLRB V. Sin-
cZair Co.,s the Board conducted an election in which the em-
ployer won. In the other two, the Board intervened at union
request before the election. In each, the union filed charges that
the employer had committed unfair labor practices4 in violation
1. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 398 F.2d 336 (4th Cir. 1968); NLRB v.
Hee's Inc., 398 F.2d 337 (4th Cir. 1968); General SteelProducts, Inc. v.
NLRB, 398 F.2d 339 (4th Cir. 1968) ; NLRB v. Sinclair Co., 397 F2d 157 (Ist
Cir. 1968). The three Fourth Circuit cases were consolidated under one peti-
tion by the National Labor Relations Board. In granting certiorari, the Su-
preme Court joined the case of Food Store Employees Local 347 v. Gissel Pack-
ing Co., 398 F.2d 336 (4th Cir. 1968). These cases represented some of the con-
troversies over the authenticity of the card authorization process. They included
the method of determination of the employees' representative under Section
8(a) (5) of the National Labor Relations Act [hereafter referred to as the Act],
the validity of authorization cards, and the National Labor Relations Board's
[hereafter referred to as the Board] discretion to issue a bargaining order.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1964) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to
bargain collectively with representatives of his employees, subject
to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title.
2. A typical card (one used in the Charleston campaign in Heck's) states
in relevant part:
Desiring to become a member of the above Union of the Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffers, Warehousemen and
Helpers of America, I hereby authorize you, or your agents or rep-
resentatives to act for me as collective bargaining agent on all mat-
ters pertaining to rates of pay, hours or any other condition of em-
ployment.
See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 89 S.Ct. 1918, 1924 n.4.
3. 398 F.2d 339 (4th Cir. 1968); 397 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1968).
4. The unfair labor charges included coercively interrogating employees
about union activities, threatening them with reprisals including discharge,
promising benefits, creating the appearance of surveillance, threatening dis-
charge by closing the entire plant, and refusing to bargain with the union rep-
resentative.
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of Sections 8(a)(1) 5 and 8(a)(5) of the Act, and two of the
unions alleged a violation of Section 8(a)(3).6 The Board
sustained the charges in each case, setting aside the two elections,
and ordered each of the employers to bargain with the union
representing the majority of its employees at the time the bar-
gaining request was filed, to be determined by an authorization
card count.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari 7 in all of the cases and
ruled in the Board's favor in each. The First Circuit's ruling
was affirmed, while the rulings of the Fourth Circuit were
reversed and remanded to the Board for further proceedings.
The Court held that the possession by a union of unambiguous,
single-purpose authorization cards, obtained from a majority of
the employees without "misrepresentation or coercion" is suffi-
cient to create a duty on the part of the employer to bargain if
he has substantially interfered with a fair election by conducting
unfair labor practices, and that a bargaining order is an "appro-
priate and authorized remedy". National Labor Relations Board
1P. Gisel Paeking Co., 89 S. Ct. 1918 (1969).
I. EBm oxmm's Dun- TO BARGAmn
Before Gissel, the argument had persisted that an employer
did not have a duty to bargain with a union which had not been
certified by means of a secret-ballot election in accordance with
Section 9(c) of the Act." The argument was grounded in the
legislative history of the Act and upon the 1947 Taft-Hartley
Amendments to the Act. The argument as adopted by the
5. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (1) (1964) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 157 of this title.
6. Both Gissel Packing Co. and Heck's, Inc., were accused of wrongfully
discharging employees for engaging in union activities.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1964) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer by discrimina-
tion in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or con-
dition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in
any labor organization ....
7. All four cases were appealed from the Board decisions to the circuit
courts by the employers. The First Circuit court sustained the Board's find-
ing and enforced its bargaining order in full. The Fourth Circuit in separate
decisions sustained the Board's findings as to the employers' violations of sec-
tion 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (3), but it rejected the findings of the section 8(a) (5)
violations and declined to enforce the bargaining orders on the grounds of the
inherent unreliability of authorization cards and the absence of such extensive
and pervasive unfair labor practices by the employers as to render bargaining
orders the only available remedy.
8. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1964).
[Vol. 21
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language as "the only means by which a refusal to bargain can
be remedied is an affirmative order requiring the employer to
bargain with the union which represented a majority at the time
the unfair labor practice was committed."88 The Court has
granted the Board liberal powers to provide remedies for unfair
labor practices by employers and has stated that the Board's
order should stand unless shown to be contrary to the "policies
of the Act."3 14 In Consolo v. Federal Maritime Commission,35 the
Court had emphasized the weight to be given a federal board
decision, recognizing that "[b]y giving the agency discretionary
power to fashion remedies, Congress places a premium upon
agency expertise, and, for the sake of uniformity, it is usually
better to minimize the opportunity for reviewing courts to sub-
stitute their discretion for that of the agency. '88
In Gissel, the Court refused to accept the position taken by the
Fourth Circuit on behalf of employers that the Board had other
remedies without resorting to the "unnecessarily harsh remedy"
of a bargaining order, and stated that the "order is designed as
much to remedy past election damage as it is to deter future mis-
conduct.137 The Court, by granting the Board the power to issue
bargaining orders in any case where unfair labor practices had
only a substantial effect on the election machinery, was simply
expanding upon the powers previously recognized even by the
Fourth Circuit, which had previously allowed the Board to issue
a bargaining order without an election in "exceptional cases
marked by outrageous and pervasive unfair labor practices." In
its conclusion, the Court equivocated in saying that there is no
absolute rule for the issuing of a bargaining order following the
occurrence of unfair labor practices, and limited its decision to
those situations which interfere with election machinery.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court rejected the Fourth Circuit's position as to the
invalidity and unreliability of authorization cards by upholding
and expanding the Board's use of the Cumberland Shoe formula.
However, it refused to say that a union could gain representative
33. Frank Brothers Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702, 703-04 (1943), accord,
NLRB v. P. Lorillard Co., 314 U.S. 512, 513 (1942).
34. Fireboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 216 (1964).
35. 383 U.S. 607 (1966).
36. Id. at 621, accord, NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 346
(1953).
37. 89 S.Ct. at 1939.
1969]
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status via authorization cards without coincident unfair labor
practices by the employer. Nor did the Court indicate how insub-
stantial these unfair labor practices can be before the union will
not be recognized without an election by means of a bargaining
order. These questions remain open. The decision, nonetheless,
grants to the Board so much additional power to recognize a
union as employee representative and to issue bargaining orders
requiring employers to recognize such unions that it may well
lead employers and employees to be even more judicious in their
attitudes toward authorization cards.
DoNmAI A. Hnmim
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TORTS-Intrafamily Immunity-Doctrine of intrafamily im-
munity overruled in case of non-willful tort. Gelbman v. Geb-
man (Ct. App. N.Y. 1969).
The plaintiff, a passenger in an automobile driven by her
unemancipated sixteen-year-old son, suffered injuries when their
automobile collided with another. The plaintiff brought separate
suits against each driver. The insurance company representing
the son in the second action asserted as an affirmative defense
that the defendant-son was the unemancipated child of the plain-
tiff. Relying on previous decisions which had followed the intra-
family immunity rule, the trial court dismissed the complaint
and was unanimously affirmed by the Appellate Division. The
New York Court of Appeals, in reversing and remanding, held
that the intrafamily immunity rule will no longer be applied to
cases of non-willful torts. GeZbman v. Gelbman, 297 N.Y.S.2d
529 (Ct. App. N.Y. 1969).
New York now joins Alaska,1 Minnesota,2 Missouri,3 New
Hampshire, 4 and Wisconsin5 in allowing intrafamily non-willful
tort suits. Most of these jurisdictions, like New York, have placed
no qualifications on their adoption of the expanded doctrine.
Wisconsin, however, perhaps wisely, applied the rule only in
cases where the injury results from an exercise of parental
authority, or where a parent was exercising discretion as to lodg-
ing, food, clothing, or other parental responsibilities. 6 Since most
of these cases have arisen from automobile accidents,7 the courts
apparently concluded that this causative pattern will continue to
be true. Some courts saw fit to comment, although New York did
not, on the possibility of a flood of unnecessary and unwarranted
family injury cases. In Baits v. Baits, the Minnesota court ob-
served that except for automobile accident cases, tort actions
within the family do not occur with any frequency." The question
now is, will the courts find that this earlier trend of non-litiga-
tion will continue?
1. Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alas. 1967).
2. Baits v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966).
3. Wells v. Wells, 48 S.W.2d 109 (Mo. Ct. App. 1932).
4. Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 244 A2d 588 (1966).
5. Goller v. White, 20 Wis.2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
6. Id. at 413, 122 N.W.2d at 198.
7. See Annot, 60 A.L.R.2d 1285 (1958).
8. 273 Minn. 419, 430, 142 N.W.2d 66, 73 (1966).
19691
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By its decision, the New York court overrules three New York
cases9 and breaks with a precedent first established in the Mis-
sissippi case of Hewellette v. George.10 In Hewellette, the court
would not permit a daughter to sue her mother for wrongful
confinement, saying that it would disrupt family unity. The
Hewellette case was a rather flimsy base for such an important
rule, since the facts were indefinite as to the relationship between
the mother and daughter. The daughter, a minor, was married
but separated from her husband; thus arose a question of wheth-
er she was emancipated. The Mississippi court was unable to
resolve the emancipation question on the facts presented. From
this decision, however, the present-day intrafamily immunity
rule has evolved.11 Hewellette was followed shortly thereafter by
McKelvey v. HcKelvey12 in Tennessee and Roller v. Roller's in
Washington, both citing Hewellette as the basis for the rule, and
both mentioning family disruption as a reason for disallowing
such a suit.
The Gelbman court justified overruling precedent on the
grounds that the legislature had failed to act despite the court's
earlier invitation. The court decided that since this was a court-
created rule, a court could abrogate it, especially in light of
court-initiated erosion of the rule in other states.
The principal reason why the New York court and others have
found it easier to allow such suits involving automobile accidents
is the existence of compulsory automobile liability insurance.
This development undermines the underlying basis for the rule,
which is that such suits tend to disrupt family harmony. Where
insurance coverage is present, the adversaries are insurance car-
rier against parent or child, rather than parent against child. As
the Gelbman court observed, to prevent such a suit would be more
9. Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 174 N.E2d 718, 215 N.Y.S.2d 35
(1961) ; Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N.Y. 425, 40 N.E.2d 236 (1942) ; Sorrentino v.
Sorrentino, 248 N.Y. 626, 162 N.E. 551 (1928).
10. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
11. In South Carolina, the doctrine is still strictly adhered to. Gunv. Rollings,
250 S.C. 302, 157 S.E.2d 590 (1967) ; Maxey v. Sauls, 242 S.C. 247, 130 S.E.2d
570 (1963); Parker v. Parker, 230 S.C. 28, 94 S.E.2d 12 (1956); Kelly v.
Kelly, 158 S.C. 517, 155 S.E. 888 (1930). According to Kelly, the rule in South
Carolina is based on the common law doctrine of intrafamily immunity and
cites as supporting authority the Tennessee case of McKelvey v. McKelvey
(in fra n. 12). The other cases cite Kelly and give public policy and disruption
of family unity as the reasons for the adoption of the rule.
12. 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903).
13. 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
[ ol. 21
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likely to cause family discord than foster it. 14 The court said that
it could uphold the rule only if it found that by not doing so,
family discord would ensue. The court concluded that under the
present set of facts, family disruption would not result from
deciding in the plaintiff's favor.
In doing away with the doctrine, the court did not restrict its
decision to a factual situation of a parent-plaintiff versus a
child-defendant, but sought to include the reverse situation as
well. In fact, in the three prior New York cases which Gelbman
overrules, the reverse situation was present. The court observed
that there are differences in the two situations, but since the
underlying basis for the rule in either situation is the same, both
should be treated in the same manner. This is generally the way
that other courts have resolved the matter.15 The major differ-
ence between the two situations which is mentioned is that when
the parent is the plaintiff, to allow the suit would permit the
parent to assert a form of discipline over the child-defendant.
Thus, it would seem that a parent-plaintiff situation would have
a stronger rationale for suit than would a child-plaintiff.
The court also found sufficient reason for reversal in the
observation that it and other courts are now making numerous
exceptions to allow suits once prohibited by the rule. The court
did not dwell on these points, but merely summarized the excep-
tions discussed at length by Chief Judge Fuld in his dissent in
Badigian v. Badigian.16 These exceptions helped to weaken the
rule by finding that in certain situations, "there is no clash
between the claim asserted and the protection of family
felicity." 7
The first exception noted was that New York and other juris-
dictions generally do not apply the rule when the child is of
legal age.' 8 Judge Fuld said in Badigian that if the rule were
14. To allow the parent to collect would facilitate discipline over the child
and would keep the family pocketbook from having to be utilized. To not allow
it would remove the form of discipline and perhaps cause a strain on the family's
finances.
15. Parker v. Parker, 230 S.C. 28, 94 S.E.2d 12 (1956) ; Shaker v Shaker,
129 Conn. 518, 29 A.2d 765 (1942) ; Wells v. Wells, 48 S.W.2d 109 (Mo. Ct
App. 1932).
16. 9 N.Y.2d 472, 474, 174 N.E.2d 718, 720, 215 N.Y.S.2d 35, 37 (1961).
17. Comment, Intrafanily Immunity-The Doctrine and Its Present Status,
20 BAY. L. RPv. 27, 57 (1968).
18. When one reaches majority, he is under the law an adult and is thus
legally deemed independent of the family. This independence destroys (in the
eyes of the law, if not in fact) the family relationship on which the doctrine is
based. Since, factually, this is not always the case, it would seem to have been
better to have based such an exception on actual emancipation rather than age.
19691
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based on "filial duty or family peace," 19 the age factor should
have no effect on the rule. The court also noted that such claims
are preserved until a minor reaches majority by New York's
Czv Px&crTncn LAW AND RUES.
20
The court next discussed the fact that intrafamily suits have
been allowed in the case of property damage involving contracts,
inheritances, and wills. Cases confirming this are numerous.2 1
The fact that such suits are allowed under these circumstances
is indeed a strong reason for reversal of the rule. Why, it has
been asked, should a suit be allowed in the case of a dented fen-
der and not allowed in the cases of a broken arm?2 2 It has been
pointed out, moreover, that some of the most bitter litigation
recorded has dealt with intrafamily property settlements.23 The
court further pointed out that intrafamily suits in cases of in-
tentional torts have been allowed in many jurisdictions.
2 4
The last exception noted was the recognition of suits where the
injury results from the parent's participation in a business
activity. This, along with the discipline aspect, is an exception
which bears out the difference between suits by the parent as
plaintiff versus the child as plaintiff. In the recorded cases in
which this exception was made, the situation has been child-
plaintiff versus parent-defendant. It is not inconceivable, how-
ever, that the reverse could occur equally as often. Yet when a
court allows an injured child to sue the parent's employer or
the parent himself in a business capacity, it is merely obscuring
the issue. In both instances, the suit in reality will have an effect
on the parent and thus could cause family discord. If the em-
ployer indirectly is held liable for the parent's tort, he may seek
indemnification from the parent. If the parent is sued in a busi-
ness capacity (for example, a child hurt at parent-owned store),
the parent is most directly affected by the suit. This exception,
nevertheless, has been applied by at least two courts.
25
19. 9 N.Y.2d 472, 476, 174 N.E.2d 718, 721, 215 N.Y.S.2d 35, 39 (1961).
20. N.Y. CIVIL PRAcrIcE LAW AND RuLEs (McKinney 1964).
21. Preston v. Preston, 102 Conn. 96, 128 A. 292 (1925); Lamb v. Lamb,
146 N.Y. 317, 41 N.E. 26 (1895); King v. Sells, 193 Wash. 294, 75 P2d 130
(1938).
22. Comments on Recent Important Tort Cases, 32 Am. TRIAL LAWmES LJ.
165, 279 (1968), (Formerly NACCA L.J.).
23. Id.
24. Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955) ; Manke v. Moore,
197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951); Siembab v. Siembab, 202 Misc. 1053, 112
N.Y.S.2d 82 (1952).
25. Chase v. New Haven Waste Material Corp., 111 Conn. 377, 150 A. 107
(1930) ; Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952).
[Vol. 21
8
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 5 [1969], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol21/iss5/7
1RECENT DECISIONS
Relying on the proliferation of these exceptions and on the
presence of compulsory liability insurance, the court had little
difficulty reversing the lower court rulings and consequently
the intrafamily immunity rule itself. It remained, however, for
the court to comment on the oft-mentioned possibility that in the
absence of such a rule, there will be many fraudulent claims.
The court left to the jury system the responsibility for dealing
with fraud and collusion, as it must do in many other tort cases.
As was pointed out in Balts, jurisdictions which have discarded
intraspousal immunity have experienced no deluge of claims.
26
The presence of compulsory liability insurance makes this a
very sound decision since, in the past, most cases in which the
rule has been applied have dealt with accidents connected with
motor vehicles. If, unexpectedly, intrafamily suits begin to arise
in instances not covered by liability insurance and in which
there actually is a clash between the claim asserted and family
felicity, courts may want to review the new rule and perhaps
reaffirm a restricted version of the old.
JOHN C. HAYES
26. 273 Minn. 419, 430, 142 N.W.2d 66, 73 (1966).
1969]
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Right to trial by jury-Contemnor
not entitled to jury trial where sentence does not exceed six
months imprisonment and three years probation. Frank v.
United States (S.Ct. 1969).
The defendant violated a 1962 injunction restraining him from
the use of interstate facilities for the sale of certain oil interests
without first obtaining a license from the Securities and Ex-
change Commission. Charged with criminal contempt, he de-
manded a trial by jury but his request was denied by the district
court. He was convicted, given a suspended sentence, and placed
on probation for three years. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. Certiorari was granted and the
Supreme Court, in affirming, held that in criminal contempt
proceedings, a contennor is entitled to a jury trial unless the
offense can be classified as petty, and petty offenses are not
rendered serious where an additional probation period is im-
posed. Frank v. United States, 89 S.Ct. 1503 (1969).
The right to a trial by jury in all criminal prosecutions is
expressly provided for in the Federal Constitution.' Even at
common law, however, so-called "petty" offenses were tried by
the courts sitting without juries.2 As early as 1888, the Supreme
Court ruled that petty offenses could be adjudicated summarily
without a jury." It has been held that contempt is not a "crime"
within the meaning of the Constitutional provisions for trial by
jury. In Green v. United States,4 for example, the defendants
fled when served with notice of the execution of their sentence,
and remained absent for over four and a half years. Upon their
return, they were tried without a jury and convicted of con-
tempt. The Supreme Court affirmed, stating that "[tlhe prin-
ciple that criminal contempts of court are not required to be
tried by a jury under Article III or the Sixth Amendment is
firmly rooted in our traditions. Indeed, the petitioners them-
selves have not contended that they were entitled to a jury
trial."" Thus, the idea that all contemnors are entitled to a jury
trial is without basis and has long been repudiated by American
courts. In the recent decision of United States v. Barnett,6 the
1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); 31 Am. JurL Jury § 36
(1958).
3. Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888).
4. 356 U.S. 165 (1958).
5. Id. at 187.
6, 376 U.S. 681 (1964).
[Vol. 21
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Court reiterated this principle and listed over fifty decisions,
beginning in 1812 and ending in 1964, to support it.
Prior to Frank, the Court had maintained that the severity of
the sentence authorized was the most relevant criterion in deter-mining whether the offense was petty and therefore exempt
from a jury trial.7 In the area of criminal contempt, however,
Congress had specified maximum penalties for only a few types
of contempt." The question of whether an act of contempt which
lacked a specified maximum penalty could be classified as petty
was dealt with in (heff v. Schnackenberg. Looking to the six-
month imprisonment penalty which was adtualdy imposed, the
Court decided that it was within the ambit of petty offenses'0
and therefore no jury trial was necessary.
The Frank court was faced with the task of reconciling the
addition of a three-year probation term with the six-month
prison sentence rule set out in Cheff. In reaching its decision,
the Court interpreted the federal probation statute," which pro-
vides that up to five years probation may be imposed for any
crime not punishable by death or life imprisonment, as being
applicable to petty as well as serious crimes. The Court reasoned
that since Congress had specifically included the above catego-
ries of crimes, it clearly had intended the probation provisions
to apply to petty offenses. Consequently, a term of probation
would not place an otherwise petty offense in the serious cate-
gory and require a trial by jury.12 Since Congress had not
viewed the maximum of five years probation as onerous enough
to make an otherwise petty offense serious in noncontempt cases,
the Court thought it best for Congress to take the first step in
determining that such was onerous in contempt cases.
7. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) ; District of Colum-
bia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937).
8. 10 U.S.C. § 848 (1964) (thirty days confinement and $100 where the
contemptuous act occurs in the presence of a military tribunal); 18 U.S.C. § 402
(1964) (six months imprisonment and $500 where the contemptuous act also
constitutes a separate criminal offense) ; 42 U.S.C. § 1995 (1964) (special pro-
visions where the contempt arises under civil rights statutes) ; 42 U.S.C. § 2000
h (1964) (right to trial by jury under certain sections of civil rights statutes).
9. 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
10. The Cheff court arrived at a six-month demarcation by analogy to 18
U.S.C. § 1 (3) which provides: "Any misdemeanor, the penalty for which does
not exceed imprisonment for a period of six months or a fine of not more than
five hundred dollars, or both, is a petty offense."
11. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1964).
12. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). The Court distinguished the
Cheff decision, which was applicable only to federal courts, whereas Duncan
was applicable to state courts.
1969]
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The rationale for denying the defendants a trial by jury in
petty offense cases is that the consequences to the defendants
from conviction are not severe enough to warrant the unavoid-
able clogging of court dockets with expensive and time consum-
ing jury trials.18 The majority in Frank admitted that probation
was a "significant infringement of personal freedom" but
thought that it was "certainly less onerous a restraint than jail
itself."'14 The dissent,15 on the other hand, viewed the majority
reasoning as "an alarming expansion of nonjury contempt
power" and "a new weapon for chilling political expression in
the unrestrained hands of trial judges."16 The dissent vigorously
asserted that probation was potentially even more onerous than
jail itself. To illustrate, Chief Justice Warren pointed out that
a court could require a defendant to keep "reasonable hours,"
remain in the jurisdiction, associate with only "law abiding"
citizens and require him to "work regularly." Strictly enforced,
the obvious effect of such conditions would be to virtually con-
trol the defendant's every movement. Moreover, as a result of the
slightest violation of any condition, even after four years and
eleven months probation, a court could suspend the probation
and place the defendant in jail for an additional six months.
Chief Justice Warren also noted a trend in state courts toward
imposing even longer probation periods in nonjury trials.
Heretofore, the Court had ruled that a crime punishable by
imprisonment for two years or more required a jury trial in
state courts.17 While the Frank decision does not purport to
place further limits on the earlier rule with respect to probation,
when the question does arise on the state level, it will be inter-
esting to note the outcome.
Ostensibly, the Court in Frank followed the ruling in ('heff
by adhering to its petty-serious distinctions and the rationale
that six-month sentences lack severity. In view of the high
degree of control which may be exercised over a defendant while
on extended probation, however, it would seem that the reason-
13. Id. at 160.
14. 89 S.Ct. at 1506-07.
15. Warren, C. J., Douglas and Black, J.J., dissented.
16. 89 S.Ct. at 1507. Chief Justice Warren's strong language indicated his
concern over the possible effects of this decision with respect to court-control
of minority groups seeking to express their views. He suggested that this
new probation power, when used punitively and coupled with the injunctive
and contempt powers, will provide the courts with a much too easy method for
restraining these groups from voicing their opinions.
17. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
[Vol. 21
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ing underlying the two decisions is somewhat inconsistent. As
a result, nonetheless, the nonjury contempt power of federal
courts has been considerably broadened by Frank, clearly mark-
ing the inclination by the Court to re-invoke its noncontempt
solutions employed in other recent decisions in this area.' 8 Ad-
mittedly, as the majority opinion implied, not all contemnors
should be granted jury trials for the obvious reason that such
a rule would unnecessarily delay enforcement of court orders.19
On the other hand, it may be that Frank has provided the
federal courts with an excessive amount of nonjury contempt
power. Chief Justice Warren, in his dissent, suggested that a
strict adherence to a maximum six-month penalty in all con-
tempt sentences is the best approach to the problem, without
regard to whether the six months is served on probation or in
prison. Such a mechanical rule seems inflexible, however, in
view of the varying degrees of control which may be exercised
over a defendant while on probation. Certainly, a five-year pro-
bation term requiring only that a defendant report to a proba-
tion officer once a month is less onerous a restraint than a six-
month jail term. But a five-month probation term could be
made nearly as onerous as a longer prison sentence if a court
were so inclined.
It is suggested that a better approach to the problem would
be to concede the Frank majority's holding that the probation
term is inconsequential," but limit the probationary restrictions
which may be imposed in nonjury trials. Thus, the degree of
control, rather than the length of the sentence, would be the
18. See, e.g., Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968). The defendant was
convicted of criminal contempt and sentenced to imprisonment for two years.
The Supreme Court ruled that denying him a jury trial was error and reversed
the lower court; Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966). The Cheff
court limited the nonjury contempt power of federal courts to those cases in
which the sentence was six months confinement or less.
19. See, Note 45 TE.xAs L. REv. 176, 179 (1966-67). In most petty contempt
situations, the judge is as well-qualified to determine whether the contempt has
occurred as a jury would be. It is argued that economy and efficiency outweigh
any improvement in the quality of justice which might result by granting the
defendant a jury trial under these circumstances.
20. While the narrow holding of Frank is that a three-year probation term
is not severe enough to warrant a trial by jury, it seems clear, however, in view
of the Court's emphasis of 18 U.S.C. § 3651, that the same result would be
reached were a defendant's probation term the maximum of five years.
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determining factor as to whether a defendant is entitled to a
jury trial.21
YANEcy A. MoLwoD, J.
21. Admittedly, the efficacy of such a solution is open to criticism. The ef-
fectiveness of the probation system, for instance, is largely due to its flexible
nature, wherein a judge may prescribe a probation term most appropriate for
the particular defendant. Moreover, the determination as to which restrictions
would render the probation onerous enough to warrant a jury trial would be
very difficult to make in view of the innumerable types and degrees of control.
Notwithstanding these difficulties of arriving at a workable test, an over-riding
concern should be to avoid allowing a judge virtual control over a man's life for
such a considerable length of time, without a jury ever deciding whether the
alleged contempt has even occurred.
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CR MNAL PROCEDURE-Searches Incident to an Arrest-
Search conducted incident to valid arrest shall include only
accused's person and area within which he might reach a weapon
or destructible evidentiary matter. CGmel v. California (S. Ct.
1969).
On September 13, 1965, Orange, California, police obtained an
arrest warrant for defendant for burglary of a coin shop and
arrested him in his home. Over the defendant's objection, and
without a search warrant, the officers searched the entire three-
bedroom house, including an attic, garage, small workshop, and
numerous drawers in the furnishings. The officers seized nu-
merous coins and other numismatic items. However, none of the
seized items was then identified as taken from the coin shop.
The defendant was released later the same day. Two days later,
the confiscated items were identified by a man whose home had
been burglarized previously. On the third day, the police
arrested defendant again. The California Supreme Court ruled
that the search incident to the first arrest was reasonable and
therefore valid.
The United States Supreme Court reversed. The search of a
defendant's entire house and garage-going beyond his person
and the area within which he might have reached either a
weapon or destructible evidentiary matter-is, absent a search
warrant, unreasonable and thus invalid under the fourth and
fourteenth amendments. Chimel v. California, 89 S. Ct. 2034
(1969).
The United States Supreme Court in Carroll v. United States1
stated, by way of dictum: "When a man is legally arrested for
an offense, whatever is found upon his person or in his control
which it ig unlawful for him to have . . . may be seized ... "2
Thus, the holding in Carroll created problems of fixing the area
within a defendant's "control", the determination of which was
critical to defining the permissible scope of a search incident to
an arrest.
Following Carroll, the Court, again by way of dictum, said in
Agnello v. United State8s:
The right without a search warrant contemporaneously
to search persons lawfully arrested while committing
1. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
2. Id. at 158.
3. 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
19691
15
et al.: Recent Decisions
Published by Scholar Commons, 1969
SoUTH CAnOanoA LAw Ruvmw
crime and to search the place where the arrest is made
in order to find and seize things connected with the
crime as its fruits or as the means by which it was
committed, as well as weapons and other things to effect
an escape from custody, is not to be doubted.4
Agnello re-enunciated a broad right of police to conduct a search
incident to a valid arrest. While this rule has been relied on
frequently by the courts and law enforcement officers, there has
persisted a patent misunderstanding of the allowable scope of
such a search.5
Three cases exemplify pre-Ckimew attitudes on the permissible
scope of such searches. In the first of these, Harri* 'V. United
States,6 police officers had obtained a warrant for the de-
fendant's arrest for his alleged violation of the Mail Fraud
Statute and the National Stolen Property Act.7 Pursuant to his
arrest, the officers searched the defendant's entire four-room
apartment for two cancelled checks thought to have been used in
effecting a forgery. Instead, the officers discovered a sealed
envelope marked "George Harris, personal papers". Tearing
open the envelope, they found certain altered selective service
documents. Defendant was subsequently convicted for violation
of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940. Defendant's
averment that the search was violative of fourth amendment pre-
cepts was rejected and the search was upheld as incident to an
arrest. The Court held that since the defendant was in "exclusive
possession" of the apartment, his control extended to all four
rooms. Discarding the theory that only the room in which the
arrest was consumated could be searched, the Court said: "But
the area which reasonably may be subjected to search is not to be
determined by the fortuitous circumstance that the arrest took
place in the living room as contrasted to some other room of the
apartment."8 Thus, the Court construed immediate control to
include those areas not under a defendant's physical control.
4. Id. at 30.
5. See, e.g., Way, Increasing Scope of Search Incidental to Arrest, 159
Wash. Univ. L.Q. 261 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Way] ; Note, Scope Limita-
lions for Searches Incident to Arrest, 78 Yale L.J. 433 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as Scope Limitations]; Annot, 19 A.L.R. 3d 727 (1968). A general discussion
of search and seizure law is found in Note, Search and Seizure - A Constitu-
tional Standard for South Carolina, 17 S.C.L. REv. 687 (1965).
6. 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
7. 35 Stat. 1130, 1131 ch. 321, 18 U.S.C.A. § 338, 7 F.C.A. title 18 § 338;
[August 3, 1939] 53 Stat. 1178, 1179, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 413 et. seq., 7 F.C.A. title
18, §§ 413 et. seq.
8. 331 U.S. at 152.
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Such areas were deemed to be in his "constructive possession.'
In the second case, Trupiano v. United States,l0 the Court
retreated from the permissiveness expressed in Harris and held
that warrantless searches would be allowed only where it was
impracticable to procure a search warrant. The Court also held
that a lawful arrest would not, in itself, suffice as an exigency
satisfying the necessity requirement."'
In the third case, United States vo. Rabinowitz, 12 the Court
overruled Tupiano. In that case, police officers had procured
a warrant for the defendant's arrest based on allegations that he
was dealing in stamps bearing forged overprints. Government
officers arrested Rabinowitz in his one-room office and, over
his objections, searched the desk, safe, and the file cabinets for
approximately an hour and a half. The fruits of this search were
introduced in evidence against him. In overruling Trupiano, the
Court held:
The relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to pro-
cure a search warrant, but whether the search was rea-
sonable. That criterion in turn depends upon the facts
and circumstances - the total atmosphere of the case.13
The Handbook on the Law of Searib and Seizure,14 prepared
by the United States Department of Justice, illustrates the
permissiveness allowed under the Harris-Rabinowitz standards. 15
9. For a caustic and eloquent denunciation of the Harris majority's applica-
tion of the property-oriented "constructive possession" doctrine, see Harris at
164 (dissenting opinion).
10. 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
11. "A search or seizure without a warrant as an incident to a lawful arrest
has always been considered to be a strictly limited right. It grows out of the in-
herent necessities of the situation at the time of the arrest. But there must be
something more in the way of necessity than merely a lawful arrest." Id., at 708.
12. 339 U.S. 56 (1948).
13. Id. at 63.
14. LEGISLATION AND SPECIAL PRoJEcrs S CTION, CRImIAL DIvIsiON, DE-
PARTMENT OF JusTICE, Handbook on the Law of Search and Seizure (1968).
15. The Limits on the Search of the Person.
(A) You may search the person completely.
(1) Things in actual possession. Anything in the actual possession of the per-
son arrested may be searched....
(2) Things within his reach. All those immediate physical surroundings
which may be considered an extension of his person ... may be searched.
(3) Things in constructive possession. Where an arrestee has on his person
some article showing ownership or right to control personal property from which
he is temporarily separated, you may search for and seize such property (eg.
Where the arrestee has a locker key in his possession you may search the
locker).
(4) Things in open view. If without searching you see contraband, fruits,
weapons, instrumentalities, or mere evidence of crime left in open sight, you
may seize them....
(5) Things in body cavities....
Id. at 19-20.
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Of particular interest is the handbook's assertion that an officer
could extend his search "beyond the room where the arrest oc-
curred to include the entire premises under the arrested person's
custody and control.... ."1 As is readily apparent, the scope of
a search incident to an arrest as defined by the Department of
Justice and disseminated to police officers throughout the nation
was quite broad.
Criticism of the Harris-Rabinowitz standard's infringement of
individual privacy soon developed.17 In order to clarify the
permissible scope of searches incident to arrest and redefine the
restrictions on their use, the Supreme Court, in ChinZ v. Cadi-
fornia,"' overruled both Hrari and Rabinowitz."0  Justice
Stewart's majority opinion, citing Justice Frankfurters dis-
senting opinion in Rabinowitz, discussed the historical antece-
dents of searches incident to arrest.20  These searches, he con-
cluded, are exceptions to the constitutional prohibition of
warrantless searches.21 The Court placed the burden of estab-
lishing the exigency meriting such a search on those who seek to
avail themselves of the exception.22 Concluding that the decision
reached by the Rabinowitz court had been "hardly founded on
an unimpeachable line of authority,"23 the ChimeZ court revita-
lized the delimiting influence of Tmpiano on HarAi. 24
16. Id. at 31, 32.
17. See, e.g., Way at 274; Scope Limitations at 435. The latter article is an
excellent critique of the problems precipitated by Harris and Rabinowita. See
also Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. at 162-168 (dissenting opinion) ; United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 78-79 (dissenting opinion).
18. 89 S. Ct. 2034 (1969).
19. Id. at 2043.
20. "It's basic roots, however, lie in necessity. What is necessity? Why is
search of the arrested person permitted? For two reasons: first, in order to
protect the arresting officer and to deprive the prisoner of potential means of
escape . . ., and, secondly, to avoid destruction of evidence by the arrested per-
son." United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 72 (dissenting opinion). Accord,
Way at 263.
21. "We are not dealing with formalities. The presence of a search warrant
serves a high function. Absent some grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment
has interposed a magistrate between the citizen and the police." Chimel court
quoting from McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948). See also
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 72 (dissenting opinion).
22. 89 S. Ct. at 2039.
23. Id. at 2038.
24. "In other words, the presence or absence of an arrestee at the exact time
and place of a . . . seizure does not determine the validity of that seizure if it
occurs without a warrant. Rather the test is the apparent need for summary
seizure, a test which clearly is not satisfied by the facts before us." The Court
did not attempt to overrule Harris but left it "to another day to test the Harris
situation by the rule that search warrants are to be obtained and used wherever
reasonably practicable." Truplano v. United States, 334 U.S. 708 & 709. Ac-
cord, "(T]he police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial ap-
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The Rabinowitz court had held that reasonableness was to be
determined by the "facts and circumstances -the total atmos-
phere of the case." But Chimel refuted the Rabinowitz precept
that reasonableness is a function only of the conduct of the
searching officers, (that is, the facts and circumstances must be
viewed in the light of established fourth amendment principles)
and reinstates the traditional cautious attitude of the Court
toward warrantless searches.
25
The Harris-Robinowitz ruling had not precisely defined the
permissible scope of searches incident to arrest. Complicating
the problem also was the Rabinowitz assertion that "reasonable-
ness is in the first instance for the District Court to determine." 26
The Chime court apparently acted on the premise of Justice
Frankfurter's dissent in the earlier case: "It is for this court to
lay down criteria that the district judges can apply. It is no
criterion of reason to say that the district court must find it
reasonable." 27 "The only reasoned distinction", said the ChimeZ
court, "is one between a search of the person arrested and the
area within his reach on the one hand, and more extensive
searches on the other."
28
In overruling Rabinowitz and Harris, the Court has redefined
reasonable. 27 "The only reasoned distinction," said the Cfhime
person and the area 'within his immediate control'- construing
that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." 29 The Court
then defined "area" to be that "into which an arrestee might
reach."80 Thus, the Court ruled out a search of rooms other
proval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure... ." Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
25. This cautiousness is exemplified in several other pre-Rabinowitz cases.
See, e.g., United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932) ; Go-Bart Importing
Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931). In the more recent case of Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 20 (1968), the Court established a two-pronged test of reason-
ableness: "whether the officer's action was justified at its inception and whether
it was reasonably limited in scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place."
26. 339 U.S. at 63.
27. Id. at 83 (dissenting opinion). As a result of this delegation to district
courts, there had been a variety of definitions of scope. See, Scope Limitations
at 435 which presents a list of appellate court interpretations of the ambit of
immediate control. See also, Justice Frankfurter's dissent which explores the
difficulties in attempting to establish a line of demarcation between what is
within one's immediate control and what is not. United States v. Rabinowitz,
339 U.S. at 79.
28. 89 S. Ct. at 2041, 2042. The Court emphasized that any attempt to dis-
tinguish Rabinozatfa and Harris from its own factual situation on the basis of
the number of rooms searched would be highly artificial.
29. Id. at 2040.
30. Id.
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than the one in which the arrest is made and also denounced
rummaging through "desk drawers or other closed or concealed
areas in that room (place of arrest) itself."8
In dissent, Justice White, joined by Justice Black, contended
that a defendant and the area within his immediate control as
defined by Harris and Rabinowitz, "must in almost every case
be reasonable. 3 2 Arguing for retention of the pre-Ghimel stand-
ards, Justice White proffered three reasons. First, he lamented
the instability of the law governing the scope of these searches
which had been precipitated, in part, by "unexpected changes in
the courts composition." Secondly, he asserted that the disrup-
tion of a man's life and privacy stemming from an arrest is not
significantly increased by an accompanying search. Thirdly, he
said that a defendant can "shortly thereafter" receive a judicial
determination of whether the search was justified by probable
cause. 3
In rebuttal of the second and third arguments of Justice
White, the majority asserted that "the Amendment is designed to
prevent, not simply to redress, unlawful police action. In any
event, we cannot join in characterizing the invasion of privacy
that results from a top-to-bottom search of a man's house as
'minor." 3 4 The dissent's fears of instability were well-founded
but are counteracted by the infringement of individual freedom
which resulted from the warrantless searches under the Harris-
Rabinowitz standards.
lhimel, therefore, has both revitalized the Trzpiano practica-
bility criterion" and restricted the use of the warrantless search
incident to arrest to a defendant's person and the area within his
reach. In so doing, the Court has rectified many of the practices
resulting from the Havr-Rablnowitz standards. For example,
law enforcement officers had increasingly delayed arresting a
suspect until he was in a locale that they felt would produce
abundant evidence, rather than arresting him immediately after
procurement of an arrest warrant. The Ckimel holding is an
obvious reaction against such dubious tactics.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 2045 (dissenting opinion).
33. Id. at 2043-44 (dissenting opinion).
34. Id. at 2042, n. 12. See also, United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 71
(dissenting opinion). Justice Frankfurter distinguished the loss of privacy re-
sulting from arrest from that interest which is lost as result of a search.
35. Accord, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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While Chimel has clarified the Supreme Court's position on
the scope of such searches, at least two problems remain un-
solved. First, the Court has constricted "immediate control" to
an arrestee's person and the area within his reach. But what
exactly is meant by "reach"- an arm's length?3 6 In addition,
the question of whether CAimel will be applied retroactively has
been left for a later decision.'
loNALD L. MoTL Y
36. See 1969 Survey of Criminal Procedure, 21 S.C.L. Rzv. 531, 533-35,
(1969). The author of the above article has suggested that reach connotes "an
arms length". However far reach is finally deemed to be, it is still much more
restrictive than the police and district courts had construed "immediate con-
trol".
37. On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is the case of
State v. Porter, 251 S.C. 393, 162 S.E2d 843 (1968). The U.S. District Court
for the District of South Carolina, following a hearing upon a writ of habeas
corpus, declared the search of defendant's entire house (including basement) con-
ducted incident to a lawful arrest (for the possession of gambling parapherna-
lia) was unlawful because it was practicable for the officers to have obtained
a search warrant If Chimel is deemed retroactive the decision will be upheld
on appeal. The state contended that an application of the tests outlined by the
Court in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967) to the facts of Porter dic-
tate that the effect of Chimel should be prospective only. Stovall had asserted
that the following three factors should be considered in deciding whether or not
a decision is retroactive: 1-The purpose to be served by the new standards;
2-The extent of the reliance by law enforcement officers on the old standards;
3-The effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the
new standards.
An August 12, 1969 decision rendered by the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland held that Chimel does not operate retroactively to searches conducted
prior to the decision. Scott v. State, 256 A.2d 384 (1969).
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